This page runs the verification in your browser, against a public key you can fetch yourself. There is no server "verified" badge here, because a badge is just us asserting something again.
Most verifiers answer a binary question, and that is a design flaw. A binary verdict forces "I could not check that" to collapse into either a pass or a fail, and both are wrong. This one returns three states.
These are deliberately not named ALLOW, HOLD, and DENY. Those are EACL's adjudication verdicts about an agent's proposed action. These are verification verdicts about an artifact. Conflating the two surfaces would be a category error, and this surface does not make it.
EACL's Ed25519 signing key is disclosed at a permanent, no-authentication public URL. Any sealed governance decision issued by EACL carries a signature over the canonical hash of its payload; that signature verifies against this key.
This is the staging demonstration key. The canonical Genesis signing key will be committed at the Genesis tag, at which point this file becomes the pre-Genesis staging attestation. That transition will itself be signed and disclosed rather than quietly performed.
If the key shown above does not match the one you fetch yourself, stop. That discrepancy is exactly what a published anchor exists to reveal.
On 4 August 2026, a sealed EACL governance decision was verified adversarially in an isolated sandbox, using a foreign cryptographic toolchain and an independent re-implementation of EACL's canonicalization specification.
The content hash reproduced byte-for-byte. The Ed25519 signature validated. A one-character tamper of the sealed payload was rejected. The cryptography is entirely real — and the reviewer was engaged by Alethera rather than being an arm's-length third party. We state that rather than eliding it, because the claim that matters is not who checked it but that you can.
This page is a convenience, not the proof. The proof is that independent implementations converge on the same hash and the same verdict.
public_key. Better still, obtain it through a channel that has nothing to do with us.{decision, chain_event, issuer, sealed_at} per the specification above and compute SHA-256 over it with your own tools. It must equal seal.content_hash byte-for-byte.seal.signature over that 32-byte hash under the public key, using any RFC 8032 implementation in any language. Interop here is not a moving target.The procedure requires no EACL software. If you want to cross-check against ours, the offline decision-bundle verifier is documented in the EACL repository at docs/api/sealed-artifact-verification.md, and the client-side implementation this page uses is readable at /assets/eacl-public.js.
EACL's commercial premise is that its records do not overstate what happened. That premise is only credible if the records are independently verifiable — not "auditable if you trust our attestation service," but verifiable without us, against a public key we cannot secretly rotate.
So this page hands you the artifact, the key, the specification, and the tool, and invites you to try to break it. That is the entire product argument, executable, in under a minute.